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DLD-331        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1748 
___________ 
 
LOUIS COPE, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; HHS ADMINISTRATION 
COMMISSIONER; BEATRICE DISMAN, SSA Regional Admin Commissioner; POPE 
PIOUS XI SAINT MARY SUB-ACCUTE FACILITIES; ST. MICHAEL HOSPITAL; 
MID ATLANTIC PROGRAM SERVICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-06569) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kevin McNulty 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to Jurisdictional Defect, 
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 11, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 25, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Louis Cope appeals the District Court‟s order denying his motion 
for a default judgment and dismissing his amended complaint.  For the reasons discussed 
below, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
Cope‟s amended complaint, although rather opaque, appears to allege that while 
he was hospitalized at St. Mary‟s, some unnamed individuals rifled through the pockets 
of a shirt he was not wearing, found his bank-account numbers, copied them, and then 
forwarded that information to the Social Security Administration (SSA).  Because of this 
disclosure, Cope alleges, the SSA realized that he had more than $2,000 in savings, and 
thus, pursuant to SSA policy, see 42 U.S.C. § 1382, terminated his Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI).  Cope therefore sued various entities associated with St. Mary‟s 
(collectively, “St. Mary‟s”) and individuals and entities associated with the SSA 
(collectively, “the SSA”).   
Cope filed a motion for a default judgment, which the District Court denied.  St. 
Mary‟s and the SSA then filed motions to dismiss, which the Court granted.  The Court 
concluded that Cope had failed to plead a federal claim against St. Mary‟s, and that to the 
extent that he did plead a claim, he had failed to raise his right to relief above a 
speculative level.  As to the SSA, the Court held that Cope had failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies.  Cope then filed a timely notice of appeal.   
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
1
  We 
review the District Court‟s denial of Cope‟s motion for a default judgment for abuse of 
discretion, see Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000), and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court‟s order dismissing Cope‟s amended complaint, see 
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).   
As an initial matter, the District Court acted well within its discretion in denying 
Cope‟s motion for a default judgment.  Most fundamentally, it appears that both 
defendants filed their responsive pleadings within the appropriate time after being served, 
which forecloses Cope‟s request for a default judgment.  See, e.g., Gold Kist, Inc. v. 
Laurinburg Oil Co., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985).  Moreover, even if there were any 
delay, none of the relevant default-judgment factors militate in Cope‟s favor — he was 
not prejudiced by the (hypothetical) delay, there is no indication that the defendants were 
culpable, and the defendants had litigable defenses.  See Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164.  
We therefore affirm the District Court‟s order as to this claim.   
We further agree with the District Court‟s conclusion that Cope failed to plead a 
viable claim against St. Mary‟s.  To avoid dismissal, a complaint‟s “[f]actual allegations 
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  Just as the complaint in Twombly contained only 
                                              
1
 The District Court dismissed Cope‟s amended complaint without prejudice, and 
provided him 30 days to re-plead.  Cope, however, has elected to stand on his original 
complaint rather than amend or refile it, and the order dismissing the complaint without 
4 
 
“an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy,” 550 U.S. at 556, 
here Cope does not plead facts regarding who actually purloined his account information, 
when it happened, and how the communications between the individual(s) and the SSA 
occurred.  Nor does the amended complaint contain any corroborating factual averments 
that the disclosure to the SSA truly happened; rather, Cope seems to assume that because 
his benefits were terminated, St. Mary‟s must have somehow been responsible.  “[W]here 
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 
misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not „show[n]‟ — „that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2)) (second alteration in original).  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s 
dismissal of the claims against St. Mary‟s.  See, e.g., W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., 
LLC v. Huntington Nat‟l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2013). 
We also agree with the District Court that Cope failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies with respect to any claim that the SSA wrongly terminated his 
benefits.
2
  In addressing this issue in the context of a motion to dismiss, we may consider 
both the allegations in Cope‟s complaint and the “indisputably authentic documents” that 
                                                                                                                                                  
prejudice is therefore final.  See, e.g., Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1992). 
2
 The requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) that the plaintiff must complete the agency 
review process is non-jurisdictional and may be waived.  See Bowen v. City of New 
York, 476 U.S. 467, 483 (1986).  Therefore, the District Court should have relied on Rule 
12(b)(6), rather than Rule 12(b)(1), in dismissing the complaint.  See Anjelino v. N.Y. 
Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 1999).  Accordingly, “we will test the 
exhaustion . . . defense[] under Rule 12(b)(6).”  Id. at 87-88. 
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the SSA has provided.  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).  To exhaust 
administrative remedies, a claimant must seek review by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) and then the Appeals Council.  See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1400(a), 416.1429.  Here, 
Cope acknowledges in his amended complaint that he did not appeal the SSA‟s adverse 
decision to an ALJ, which is confirmed by the authentic records that the SSA presented.  
Therefore, Cope has not exhausted his administrative remedies.  Moreover, he has not 
given any indication — even after being given the opportunity to re-plead — that 
exhaustion would be futile.  See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 232, 234 (3d Cir. 
1998).  Hence, we also affirm the District Court‟s disposition of this issue. 
Finally, Cope complains that the District Court resolved these matters on the 
papers without holding oral argument.  The District Court has discretion as to whether to 
hold a hearing.  See Dougherty v. Harper‟s Magazine Co., 537 F.2d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 
1976); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.  Here, Cope was accorded several opportunities to be 
heard:  the District Court ordered him to respond to the motions to dismiss and invited 
him to amend his amended complaint, and he did in fact file several letters and 
memoranda in the District Court.  In these circumstances, it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the District Court to determine that an oral hearing was unnecessary to 
determine, as a legal matter, whether Cope‟s amended complaint adequately stated a 
claim.   
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
